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The When building new it is important to allow the host-nation to plan and have locals involved in the planning and construction part of the process. The US, along with coalition partners, NGOs, and international donors can share their experience during the planning process, but the process should belong to the host-nation government at the national and local level, and be carried out by the host-nation population. Frederik Rosen in his article on using military organization for non-kinetic operations discusses the "temptation" to allow donor nations and coalition partners to make the decisions and create plans rather than seeking the advice or opinion from the host nation. However, there is a need to give the ownership to the country in need. 4 Currently, in Afghanistan, international contractors accomplish the vast majority of the work, the Afghan people are separated and isolated from plans and projects until they are ready for turnover. 5 According to the report prepared for the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan, Afghans were not allowed to participate in planning processes due to the security environment. Reconstruction efforts were "disconnected from the realities and concerns of practitioners at field level and completely disconnected from those of ordinary Afghan people. "6 Much of the construction effort fell into the framework of a charity offering. Therefore the Afghan recipients often did not see projects as beneficial to the community. Sewage treatment facilities, power plants, dining halls, and even entire bases were white elephants that had more benefit broken down for materials. Sewage treatment plants become lagoons, power plants were dismantled and switched for small inexpensive generators or solar panels, and outdoor freezers were converted into supply closets. Ironically, in a campaign with the stated goal of winning hearts and minds, the US skipped the mental half of the equation. Without engaging the minds of the Afghans, the US hoped to endear themselves to the population. This paper will examine host-nation involvement in nation building efforts with a particular focus on Afghanistan, and cycles and patterns of waste and how to break these cycles. With the correct application of planning and training, the US military has the potential to be viewed as the paradigm for creating long-term benefits through focused and purposeful construction and reconstruction efforts in communities around the world. Civilian organizations encounter similar problems with stability operations. Autesserre's, book, "The Trouble With the Congo," captures nation-building in the Congo from a civilian perspective. Ultimately she feels that despite the longevity of many organizations and the dedication of some well-intentioned individuals, the efforts were a failure due to numerous preconceived notions and a lack of planning at the local level. One fundamental problem which she calls "vicious circles and shocking events" occurs when UN workers, NGOs, and diplomats do not travel outside of the capital region in the Congo and therefore do not have any sources or vision of the situation at the local level. So, plans, directions, and programs are created in a bubble and then applied across the country without regard for specific needs or challenges. 9 Her conclusion can be summed up in two key words-local involvement. Broad brushed solutions without local leader involvement will have great difficulty achieving success.
Possibilities for Construction and Reconstruction Success
As seen in the Congo example, the US military does not have a monopoly on inappropriate nation-building habits and performance. The key is to take lessons from these examples, and apply them to future operations. Trends and issues that continue to defeat military and civilian construction planners can be evaluated and measured to create better guidelines and strategy for military and civilian organizations in the future. were completed one at a time enforcing transparency and rules against bribes or other illegal activities. SIF workers were involved in the community processes to add ideas, but the town was in control, ensuring their desires, customs, and culture were promoted in the development.
Project meetings had a minimum requirement for community participation and consensus.
Projects required a percentage of local financing and an economic study to account for operations and maintenance for sustainability. This caused some communities to change their project concepts due to financial shortfalls and burdens. An example in the study included a gas line where the community had to purchase gas appliances and connection lines prior to the main line being installed. The first lines also had to go to public facilities, ensuring it benefitted the entire community, and not the personal gain for an elect few. These procedures did not always work out precisely as prescribed, but overall they promoted long-term benefits to the community, championed activism and involvement of the citizens, and taught planning and organization skills, while elevating transparency and the rule of law.
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For construction to be sustainable, it must take into account local building methods and materials. Afghanistan, like many nations in this part of the world, is covered with adobe building. 12 Adobe construction consists of dried clay or earth bricks, rammed earth, and sometimes a cement binder. Adobe type construction has been around for thousands of years. It has many benefits for moderating extreme temperatures, keeping interiors cool in the summer and maintaining warmth during winter. 13 In terms of Afghan stability operations, the best attributes of adobe materials are that the local population is familiar with using them, they are locally available, inexpensive, and very durable.
14 Instead of adobe-style buildings, the US built K-spans in Afghans. There were over 1,000
of these steel bunker-type facilities just in one province in the southern region. Locals often commented that K-spans looked like something from outer space. Also, because they were steel, they heated up like an oven and required large amounts of foam insulation which turned out to be highly flammable. 15 The end result was a structure that was uncomfortably hot, potentially dangerous, despised by the local population for its odd appearance, and unrepairable because the building components are not available locally. Thus, cooperation with the Afghans could have produced cheaper, more useful, and sustainable facilities. Similar headline news stories include, "Cost of Afghanistan project soars, benefits exaggerated" 16 , and "the United States military spent millions of dollars on a shiny new command center in the Helmand province of Afghanistan -a center that will never be used and is now likely to be completely demolished". 17 Too many projects were designed and kept close hold at such a high level that much of what was built had little to no use for the Afghans, either because the structure had no purpose for the Afghans, or because the structure itself was built in a way that was unsustainable by the local population. 18 There were numerous factors that contributed towards fraud, waste, abuse, and mission creep in the development effort. To begin, Afghanistan is a dangerous environment. Because of the logistics and transportation requirements through dangerous choke points, subcontractors were often forced to pay bribes to insurgents in order to be successful. Contracts for stability operation projects were generating profits for the same people who were compromising stability.
Abuse Cycles in Construction Efforts
Next, it is easy to look at a map and place dots representing police stations, military posts, check points, training centers, depots, and municipal buildings across a country. However, it is very hard in a hostile environment to send representatives to discuss with local leaders where these items should be built, and more importantly, how. Limited communication and mistrust prevented the Afghans from seeing detailed drawings of facilities or overall plans. This led to the construction of unwanted air conditioners, freezers, western toilets, deep fryers, and incompatible utilities and connections. On an even larger scale there were unwanted buildings, bases, and infrastructure whose components were not sustainable or usable. Last, the dangerous environment directly contributed to inadequate oversight. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), workers, military members, and contractors were often reminded of the dangers of driving through canyons to check on construction projects. USACE tried to solve this problem by checking on some projects from the air. However, a general lack of oversight in remote and dangerous areas created an environment where work was completed poorly or not at all, which resulted in wasted funds. The dangerous environment combined with a desire for progress created a vicious cycle of continued and increased fraud, waste, abuse, and mission creep. For many military, contractors, and civilian organizations involved, it was easier to turn a blind eye to the problem and remain safe for the remainder of a rotation or assignment.
Increased scope is another factor involved in a reinforcing loop with fraud, waste, abuse, 20 This can equate to a very significant income for NGOs, contractors, and USACE alike. The profits from large contracts lend themselves to an obvious reinforcing loop for scope increase. Bigger contracts create higher profits for contractors, and incentivize the need to expand services. Locals are connected to the pressure of scope increase too. Communities know they do not need costly high maintenance infrastructure, but they certainly will not say no to costly assets and infrastructure being left in their area.
A third factor influencing the trend towards waste and abuse is that military members have a desire to make an "impact" during their limited rotation of influence, to set themselves up for success in future assignments and promotions. Therefore, they needed to quickly make good relationships with the Afghans, which was typically accomplished by handing out gifts. Every rotation of personnel became littered with needless and expensive promises from senior NATO Involving the local population also places the solution back in the hands of the people being helped.
Strategic planners desired to efficiently help and support the Afghan people. The NATO/ISAF efforts in Afghanistan certainly built infrastructure that was not there before.
Unfortunately so much of it has been the wrong infrastructure. As the nation-building process is mapped out, it is not difficult to see what inputs redirected the intended result, and how numerous forces acted against the planned outcome leading towards fraud, waste, abuse, and mission creep.
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Strength In Ownership
"Military power wins battles, but spiritual power wins wars."
General George Marshall
As the future Infrastructure Training Advisory Teams (ITAT) officer in charge in Southern Afghanistan, I tried to learn as much as possible about the culture and country. I even brought a chess set because I read that many Afghans loved the game and took pride in their prowess.
Upon arrival, I found that relationships were very important. At first, I too became caught up in a loop of gift giving with Afghan commanders because I wanted to make a difference during my deployment. Many Afghan senior leaders tried extremely hard to create and strengthen relationships with not only tea and snacks, but sometimes lavish meals. In return, my counterparts and I also had much to offer. We had authorization to hand out small items to commanders and troops to include care products, food and snack items, building supplies, and repair parts. In addition, we had the ability to provide additional training opportunities for locals, issue or expand contracts, deliver large supply orders, and obtain additional goods and services. Last, we also could acquisition and deliver high demand items such as additional generators, pre-fabricated buildings, and connex storage boxes.
Over their years of working with the US military, Afghan leaders had become accustomed to the routine and knew of the potential for huge personal gain, along with the realization of the social power that came from asking for and receiving large gifts. The more gifts an Afghan obtained, the greater his prestige, which led to an enhanced desire for even bigger gifts and more These main categories were further broken down until each unit had a custom set of checklists that they could use to demonstrate their quantifiable progress toward self-sufficiency. I was excited to show off the new accounting method to our US Army Brigade Commander, and our first visit was to Zabul Province in the city of Qalat. Unfortunately, our visit was completely disrupted by an overwhelming amount of requests and favors that poured in. The Afghans saw the arrival of the colonel as an opportunity for gain. This visit was extremely frustrating. That night I came up with a plan to break this vicious cycle of constant handouts to the Afghans and help them be more sustainable and independent. I knew that it was still important to build relationships, and that prestige mattered a lot for both the Coalition partners and the Afghans; therefore, I added an eighth category: recognition.
During the next few days, the advisors created certificates that highlighted accomplishments and progression toward sustainability. Advisory teams around the South handed out a certificate to each unit on a weekly basis. The certificates were a huge hit. The overall effect was quite successful. The program was pushed as a best practice for implementation by ISAF throughout Afghanistan. The best part was the result. Afterward, when we visited each area, the Afghan commanders were eager to show off their accomplishments and best troops. Instead of asking advisors for shelving, they would properly procure and build their own shelving and organize their own supplies. This became the perfect way to break the cycle with a two-fold effect. Senior NATO leaders were eager to give out the certificates, because they quickly realized that their visits were not spoiled by the awkward requests for financial gifts, and they had more time to actually focus on building real relationships. The certificates not only stopped the waste on unneeded contracts, supplies, and equipment, but it reinforced the overall goal of a self-sustaining Afghan military and police force. A similar approach that focuses the results on a population should be applied to construction and reconstruction efforts prior to future engagements. 
Conclusion
Denis Waitley
A host nation population must be engaged at the local level during stability operations.
They must be involved in the planning, selecting, and designing process, and most importantly, they must provide labor during the construction phase of the projects. Without this involvement, a population has no buy-in, or even worse, new infrastructure and projects become a burden on communities to maintain and operate without any real hope of a sustainable future.
Uncoordinated and unsolicited projects lack enduring meaning to a local population, only adding to local haves-and-have-nots and furthering local factioning and political agendas. 23 Prior to the next nation-building engagement, the US should examine the following checklist as a guide to direct efforts.
Checklist for Nation-building reconstruction process:
1. Nation-building must involve the host nation, including the local population, in the planning process, 2. With the exception of expedient repairs such as cases due to disaster, construction efforts need to be executed primarily by the local populace, 3. Nation-building efforts can not outpace the host nation's own ability to plan, build, supervise, and then maintain their own projects, 4. Strong definable goals with an overall execution budget must be set in order to avoid the temptation of scope creep and reduce practices open to fraud, waste and abuse, 5. Projects must be accompanied by a long-term maintenance plan, created and sustained by the local population that does not involve external financial or technological capital and support, 6 . Approved projects should comply with local building standards, practices, and materials, and local construction techniques should be used for bids and designs during construction efforts, and 8. Combatant Commands need to engage with multiple diverse construction agencies and external groups to review and add insight during Phase IV construction and reconstruction planning as part of the crisis action and Joint Operation Planning Processes.
The US military is not necessarily the most appropriate organization to take on the task of construction and reconstruction efforts. However, in many cases it will continue to be the only workable option. 24 The US military is one of the only organizations worldwide, military or civilian, with the manpower, transportation, financial backing, physical security, and political will to be successful in the immense task of reconstruction efforts. These capabilities make the US military an easy and obvious go-to solution when nation-building needs arise. Based on previous and current experiences neither the US political leaders nor the military personnel are excited to engage in another nation-building task, but this ideal is not likely to be realized. The US therefore needs to give more attention to the details of the art of nation-building beginning at the combatant command level and down through the tactical level to prepare and train for this mission. Combatant Commands need to add the same emphasis to Phase IV operations as Phases III (seize the initiative), to their planning process, as well as adding the necessary training and research to execute these plans. Plans already exist for entering and occupying countries around the world. We need to include plans with exit strategies. However, because of the stigma attached to "nation building" and Phase IV operations, it is either glossed over or not included in planning and training activities. Whether the US military should or should not be involved in construction or reconstruction efforts, the reality is the military IS involved. And if our history is any predictor of the future, not only will the US continue to use the military as a nation-building tool, but they will do it again very soon. We need to plan now for the next time.
